The Federal Trade Commission announced the agenda for the fifth session of hearings which will examine vertical merger analysis and the role of the consumer welfare standard in U.S. antitrust law.

The Commission has invited public comment on issues such as whether the U.S. antitrust agencies should publish vertical merger guidelines.  What guidance should they provide regarding the assessment of the competitive effects of vertical mergers, including the substantive theories of competitive harm and the treatment of transaction-related efficiencies?  Under what conditions, if any, should the guidelines recognize a presumption of anticompetitive harm? What showing should be required to overcome such a presumption?  Under what circumstances, if any, should behavioral remedies be accepted to remedy the likely anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers?

The FTC is also soliciting comments regarding the appropriate  “consumer welfare standard” for evaluating compliance with the antitrust laws.  What are alternative frameworks with which to evaluate compliance with the antitrust laws?  What are their relative strengths and weaknesses?  Is there empirical support for preferring one standard instead of another standard?