1 2 3 4	RICHARD B. NEWMAN, Cal. Bar No. 195191 rnewman@hinchnewman.com HINCH NEWMAN LLP 1450 Broadway, 35th Floor New York, NY 10018 Telephone: (212) 756-8777 Facsimile: (866) 449-4897				
5 6 7 8 9	<ul> <li>DARREN M. FRANKLIN, Cal. Bar No. 210939 dfranklin@sheppardmullin.com</li> <li>SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER &amp; HAMPTON LLP A Limited Liability Partnership Including Professional Corporations</li> <li>333 South Hope Street, 43rd Floor Los Angeles, California 90071-1422 Telephone: (213) 620-1780</li> </ul>				
0	Attorneys for Defendant and Counter-Claimant CLICKBOOTH.COM, LLC				
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
3	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
4	SOUTHER	N DIVISION			
5	ESSOCIATE, INC., a Delaware Case No. SACV 13-01886 JVS		SACV 13-01886 JVS (DFMx)		
5 7	corporation, Plaintiff,	AUTHOR	ANDUM OF POINTS AND ITIES IN SUPPORT OF ANT CLICKBOOTH.COM, OTION FOR JUDGMENT		
8	v. CLICKBOOTH.COM, LLC,	LLC'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BASED ON PATENT INELIGIBILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101			
9 0	Defendant.	<b>JJ U.S.C.</b>	8 101		
1 2	AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIMS.	Date: Time: Courtroom: Judge:	February 2, 2015 1:30 PM 10C Hon. James V. Selna		
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### 1 I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant CLICKBOOTH.COM, LLC ("Clickbooth") brings this motion to
seek judgment on the pleadings that the asserted claims of Plaintiff Essociate, Inc.'s
patent-in-suit<sup>1</sup> are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
This motion is also being filed concurrently by Defendant 4355768 CANADA,
INC., dba Crakmedia, in co-pending *Essociate* case No. 14-00679.

7 In Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014), the 8 Supreme Court provided a two-part test to determine if a patent claims patent-9 ineligible subject matter. The first step asks whether the claims are directed to a law 10 of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea. Id. at 2355 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012)). If one of 11 12 these patent-ineligible concepts is at the heart of a patent claim, the second step 13 requires courts to "search for an 'inventive concept'—*i.e.*, an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice 14 15 amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Id. 16 Under *Alice*, abstract ideas may no longer be monopolized by saying "apply" 17 them on a computer and then drafting claims on the details of that application using 18 "computer functions [that] are 'well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]' previously known to the industry." Id. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294). 19

But that is exactly what Plaintiff's patent does here. The Essociate Patent is
directed to the abstract idea of receiving and tracking referrals from referral sources.
Essociate applied that idea to preexisting Internet "affiliate systems." It suggested
"configuring" these preexisting affiliate systems to receive and track referrals from
outside sources using routine, conventional programming functions long used on the
Internet.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> U.S. Patent No. 6,804,660 (the "Essociate Patent") is attached as Ex. 1 to the
 Declaration of Darren M. Franklin in support of this motion, filed herewith.
 References to "Ex." in this motion are to exhibits authenticated by this declaration.

Essociate's patent claims do not describe "significantly more" than the 1 2 abstract idea of receiving and tracking referrals applied to the preexisting 3 technological environment of Internet affiliate systems. As explained below, they are therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 4

#### **II. BACKGROUND** 5

6 A. **The Essociate Patent** 

7 The application for the Essociate Patent was filed on May 1, 2001. Ex. 1 8 (Essociate Patent, face page). It was one of many thousands of Internet patent 9 applications filed after the Federal Circuit started applying a permissive test for 10 patent eligibility that was later rejected. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 11 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming patent eligibility of a "data processing system . . . 12 13 for implementing an investment structure" because it provided a "useful" result). 14 The Essociate Patent relates generally to e-commerce and, more particularly, 15 to Internet-based affiliate pooling. Ex. 1, col. 1:16-19. Essociate's alleged "invention" lets webmasters "participate in existing Merchant affiliate systems 16 17 without the need of joining those Merchant affiliate systems." Id., col. 4:53-56. It 18 does that by configuring merchant affiliate systems to receive referrals from independent referral sources, which it calls "virtual affiliates." Id., col. 7:50-54. 19 20Merchants also use their preexisting tracking systems to track referrals from these 21 affiliates. Id., col. 11:45-51, 64-57.

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An "affiliate system" is itself an intangible relationship on the Internet. In Essociate, Inc. v. Blue Whaler Investments, LLC, No. CV 10-2107 JVS (MLGx) 23 24 ("Blue Whaler"), this Court construed a "merchant affiliate system" as "a system, operated directly or indirectly by a merchant, in which a group of webmasters direct 25 26 27

traffic to a merchant." Ex. 8 (Dkt. 140 at 23).<sup>2</sup> In other words, an affiliate system is
 simply a type of Internet-based referral network. The Essociate Patent uses
 "affiliate" and "webmaster" interchangeably.

Regardless of what is included within the precise scope of the term "affiliate
system," Essociate admits in its patent that such systems were conventional fixtures
on the Internet before Essociate appeared on the scene.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the patent states,
"[m]ost Merchants currently utilize some form of affiliate system to increase sales,
track traffic, and compensate Webmasters for referrals of traffic and/or
transactions." Ex.1, col. 2:8-10.

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### 1. The prior-art "stand-alone affiliate system."

Not only were affiliate systems well known before Essociate's alleged
invention, at least two distinct models had already developed. Ex. 1, col. 2, line 24.
The first model, a "stand-alone affiliate system for a single Merchant," included a
group of webmasters and a merchant affiliate system, which had a back-end tracking
mechanism. *Id.*, col. 2:30-35. The Essociate Patent explains that:
Webmasters are the content providers of the Internet, who

maintain URLs in order to disperse information and links

to other URLs. These links are often in the form of a

19 Merchant's advertisement, such as a banner ad. Therefore,

selection and placement of Merchant links. The

20 the Webmaster directs traffic to given Merchants via their

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<sup>23</sup><sup>2</sup> Clickbooth does not adopt this construction for *Markman* purposes. The Court can
rule on a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on patent eligibility "without
formally construing the claims." *See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC*, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 21633 at \*5.

<sup>26</sup> <sup>3</sup> A patent owner is bound by admissions in the patent specification about the prior

27 art. *PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc.*, 491 F.3d 1342, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
28 2007); *Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.*, 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Webmasters are then generally compensated according to a given scale or interval, based in some way on the referred traffic.

4 *Id.*, col. 2:9-17.

5 In the stand-alone affiliate system, the merchant tracks the Internet traffic sent 6 by the webmasters to the merchant's website, and "any transactions initiated by the 7 traffic are credited to the referring Webmaster." *Id.*, col. 2:42-43. As Essociate said 8 in its patent, a "good example" of the prior standalone system was the one operated 9 by Amazon.com. Ex. 1, col. 2:49-53. An Amazon prior art patent cited by the 10 Essociate Patent explains that Amazon screened potential affiliates when they 11 signed up to see if their websites were suitable for Amazon's referral network.<sup>4</sup>

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### 2. The prior-art "affiliate hub system."

13 In the second model, an "affiliate hub system" took responsibility for 14 processing potential webmasters as potential affiliates and also tracked their 15 referrals for participating merchant networks. Ex. 1, col. 3:17-42. The system included the master affiliate system ("the hub"), webmasters, and a network of 16 17 individual merchant affiliate systems. Id., col. 3:18-20. The webmasters sent 18 Internet traffic to the hub, which in turn sent the traffic to the appropriate merchant. 19 Id., col. 3:23-26. The hub had a back-end tracking mechanism to keep track of 20 transactions and credit the appropriate affiliate (webmaster). Id., col. 3:29-31. 21 Thus, the individual merchants used the hub as the conduit for webmasters to send 22 Internet traffic back to the merchants to promote the merchants' products through 23 advertisements. Id., col. 3:35-45. This was beneficial to webmasters because they 24

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<sup>4</sup> Ex. 2, U.S. Patent No. 6,029,141 to Bezos et al., col. 2:32-38. The Court may take judicial notice of background facts from publicly available documents whose authenticity is not disputed. *Branch v. Tunnell*, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). *See also* Clickbooth's Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion for Judgment on Pleadings, filed concurrently herewith.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CLICKE	300TH.COM, LLC'S
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obtained "simplified, coordinated access to the goods and services of all Merchant
 affiliate programs in the hub." *Id.*, col. 3:57-60.

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## The alleged invention—configuring merchant affiliate systems to receive referrals from outside their own affiliate networks.

5 An alleged shortcoming of an affiliate hub system is that "the Merchants must 6 share the same resources for traffic (the group of Webmasters 202), and thus risk 7 losing business to other Merchants in the hub 200." Ex 1, col. 3:60-63. In other 8 words, merchants must compete with each other for referrals from a limited pool of 9 referral sources—webmasters who decide which merchant's banner ads to put on 10 their sites. The Essociate Patent proposes to let merchants receive outside referrals from a new source—so-called "virtual affiliates," who "remain[] independent from 11 12 the Merchant's affiliate system." Id., col. 3:66 - col. 4:1; id., col. 7:50-51.

According to the patent, the virtual affiliates are provided access by an
"affiliate pooling system," which the patent describes as a combination of Internet
participants—a group of merchant-affiliated webmasters, a merchant affiliate
system, an affiliate pool of webmasters ("virtual" affiliates), and a "virtual" affiliate
system. *Id.*, col. 7:5-10.

18 Figure 3 of the patent shows an embodiment of the affiliate pooling system in 19 connection with a prior art standalone system. A group of merchant-affiliated 20webmasters 302 is associated with a merchant affiliate system 304, just as in the 21 prior-art standalone affiliate system. Id., col. 7, lines 7-9. Item 306 is just "a loose aggregation of Webmasters with a quantity of traffic." Id., col. 7, lines 31-32. Item 22 23 308 is just "a subset of the Webmasters of the affiliate pool 306 with their quantity 24 of traffic." Id., col. 7, lines 40-41. Item 310 is just a computer (the "Virtual Affiliate system") through which Internet traffic flows "as the Webmasters in the 25 26affiliate pool 306 act as Virtual Affiliates 308 of the Merchant affiliate system 304." Id., col. 7, lines 56-57. The virtual affiliate system 310 thus acts like a prior art 27 affiliate-hub system—a conduit through which webmasters can sign up and send 28

Internet traffic to a merchant. The difference is that the merchant 304 keeps its own 1 2 set of merchant-affiliated webmasters 302 in addition to receiving referrals from the 3 "virtual" pool of new webmasters 306.

4 Thus, the alleged invention is nothing more than a way to keep track of 5 referrals over the Internet using conventional components. This ensures that the 6 referral sources get compensated for referrals.

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#### 4. The patent claims.

8 Essociate has asserted claims 1, 10, 15, 23, 28 and 36 of the Essociate patent 9 against Clickbooth. Clickbooth will begin its analysis with method claims 1 and 10 10 and show why the same analysis applies to the other claims.

11 Claim 1 is an independent method claim, from which claim 10 depends. Ex. 1, cols. 21-22. Claims 15 and 23 are "computer program" counterparts to method 12 13 claims 1 and 10, respectively. Claims 28 and 36 are "system" counterparts to claims 1 and 10. As explained below, claims 1, 10, 15, 23, 28 and 36 are invalid under 35 14 15 U.S.C. § 101 because they do not constitute "significantly more" than a patent upon the abstract idea of receiving and tracking referrals from referral sources. 16

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### **III. DISCUSSION**

#### Legal Standards Governing Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings A.

"After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party 19 20may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A motion for 21 judgment on the pleadings should be granted if, "taking all the allegations in the 22 pleading as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 23 *McSherry v. City of Long Beach*, 423 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2005).

24 As the Federal Circuit has held, "[i]t is well established that 'whether the asserted claims . . . are invalid for failure to claim statutory subject matter under 35 25 26U.S.C. § 101, is a question of law." In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed. Cir. 27 2007) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. 28 Cir. 1999)). Moreover, the Section 101 inquiry is a "threshold test." Bilski, 561

U.S. at 602. A court may properly address this threshold test through a motion for
 judgment on the pleadings. *See, e.g., buySAFE, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, 765 F.3d 1350
 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming order granting motion for judgment on the pleadings
 under section 101); *McRO, Inc. v. Namco Bandai Games Am., Inc.*, No. CV 12 10327 GW (FFMx), 2014 WL 4749601, \*8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014) (granting
 judgment as a matter of law).

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### B. Legal Standards Governing Patent-Eligible Subject Matter

8 Section 101 of the Patent Act "defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354. It states, "[w]hoever invents or discovers any 9 10 new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 11 12 conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101. While the statute can be 13 read broadly, it "contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2354 14 15 (quoting Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics., Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). 16

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### 1. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank

18 In *Alice*, the Supreme Court applied the framework that it developed in *Mayo* v. Prometheus, 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012), to a software patent. The Court held that, in 19 20determining patent eligibility, it first will "determine whether the claims at issue are 21 directed to" a patent-ineligible concept (including an abstract idea) and, second, 22 "whether the claims contain 'an element or combination of elements that is 23 sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a 24 patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (other 25 quotation marks omitted).

The claims in *Alice* were directed to "a method of exchanging financial
obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary to mitigate
settlement risk" in which "[t]he intermediary creates and updates 'shadow' records

to reflect the value of each party's actual accounts held at 'exchange institutions,' 1 2 thereby permitting only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient 3 resources." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2352. The Court struck down the method claims 4 under Section 101, even though they required use of a computer to create electronic 5 shadow records, track multiple transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. These computer-implemented details did not create patent 6 eligibility because they neither "improved computer technology" nor "effect[ed] an 7 8 improvement in any other technology or technical field." Id. The Court also struck down "system" claims requiring use of a "data processing system," 9

10 "communications controller," and "data storage unit" to achieve the claimed
11 method. *Id.* at 2360. These claims, and similar "computer-readable" medium
12 claims, were not distinguishable from the method claims because they used
13 conventional functionality to carry out the abstract idea. *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2359.

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### 2. Other Recent Decisions

The Supreme Court's *Alice* decision was a significant change in determining
patent eligibility of computer-implemented methods.<sup>5</sup> Following *Alice*, the Federal
Circuit in *buySAFE*, *Inc. v. Google*, *Inc.*, struck down a patented method for offering
a "transaction performance guaranty service." 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir 2014).
The method was not even "arguably inventive" based on its use of computers to
receive and send information over a network. *Id*.

Subsequently, in *Ultramercial v. Hulu*, the Federal Circuit held that the
"invocation of the Internet" adds no inventive concept to otherwise abstract claims.

<sup>5</sup> Indeed, "in the USPTO's view, *Alice*'s embrace of the *Mayo* framework for
abstract idea cases was such a significant change or clarification that it has
withdrawn issued notices of allowance—that is, stopped patents that had made it all
the way through examination and were about to issue—'due to the presence of at
least one claim having an abstract idea and no more than a generic computer to
perform generic computer functions.'" *McRO*, 2014 WL 4749601, at \*5 n.7
(internal citation omitted).

2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21633 at \*15. The Federal Circuit also rejected the 1 2 argument that "abstract ideas remain patent-eligible under § 101 as long as they are 3 new ideas, not previously well known, and not routine activity." Id. at \*8. 4 Ultramercial's patent claimed a new, eleven-step method of distributing copyrighted 5 content over the Internet. These steps included things that were never possible before the Internet, including asking a consumer to view a sponsor message, 6 7 presenting a query to the consumer after an interactive message, recording the 8 transaction to an activity log, and receiving payment from the message sponsor. See id. at \*4-\*5. Despite this novel combination of elements, the Federal Circuit agreed 9 10 that the claims were "directed to the abstract idea of offering free media in exchange for watching advertisements and that the mere implementation of that idea on a 11 computer does not change that fact." Id. at \*4. The court thus affirmed the 12 dismissal order by the trial court at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Id.<sup>6</sup> The claims 13 14 were invalid because "each of [their] eleven steps ... merely instruct[ed] the 15 practitioner to implement the abstract idea with 'routine, conventional activit[ies],' which is insufficient to transform the patent-ineligible abstract idea into patent-16 17 eligible subject matter." *Id.* (citing *Mayo*, 132 S.Ct. at 1298).

18 Following *Ultramercial*, the Federal Circuit found that claims of an Internetrelated patent "clear[ed] the § 101 hurdle." DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, 19 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22902, \*18 (Fed. Cir. December 5, 2014). Unlike 20 21 Essociate's patent claims, the claimed invention in DDR did not make conventional use of the Internet. Id. at \*31. To the contrary, the invention in DDR was unusual 22 23 in that it "overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily 24 triggered by the click of a hyperlink." Id. That is, when a visitor clicked on a link 25 26 <sup>6</sup> The Federal Circuit had twice before reversed the district court's dismissal order,

but both of these decisions were vacated by the Supreme Court in light the Supreme Court's own decisions in *Mayo* and *Alice*. *Ultramercial*, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS
28 2166 at \*5-\*6.

for another website he wanted to visit, DDR's invention would prevent him from 1 2 leaving the host and instead create a "composite website" that had the "look and 3 feel" of the host web page with content from the website the visitor really wished to visit. DDR, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22902 at \*3-\*4. The claim survived Section 4 5 101 scrutiny because the inventors did not make "routine or conventional use of the 6 Internet" but actually created a new type of webpage preventing the computer 7 network from "operating in its normal, expected manner." Id. Moreover, the court 8 explained, the claims were unlike those at issue in recent cases such as Alice 9 because they did "not merely recite the performance of some business practice 10 known from the pre-Internet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet." Id. at \*26. Instead, the claimed solution of creating a new type of 11 12 webpage to keep visitors from leaving a host was "necessarily rooted in computer 13 technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." Id. Even so, the court cautioned, "not all claims purporting to 14 address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patenting." Id. at \*29-\*30.7 15 16 Most recently, the Federal Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings of 17 patent ineligibility of hundreds of patent claims directed to ATM technology used 18 by ATMs to read checks. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo 19 Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24258 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014). In Wells Fargo, the Federal Circuit found the claims were directed to "the abstract idea of 1) 20 21 collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory." Id. at \*7. The patentee argued that its 22 23 claims were not drawn to an abstract idea because they required use of a scanner, 24 and human minds are unable to recognize streams of bits output by a scanner. Id. at 25 26 Although DDR's claimed invention prevented hyperlinks from operating conventionally—rather than rely on their conventional operation—the panel was 27 still unable to issue its decision unanimously. DDR, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 22902, 28 \*43 (Mayer, dissenting).

\*7-\*8. The court rejected this argument, noting that the claims in *Alice* also
required a computer that processed streams of bits, but nonetheless were found
abstract. *Id.* \*8 (citing *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2358). As to the second step, though the
claims—including many dependent claims—recited details of implementing the
abstract idea using optical character recognition technology, this technology was
well-known at the time of the invention and did not transform the claim into a
patent-eligible application of the abstract idea. *Id.* at \*10-\*11.

8 In this case, as explained below, Essociate used computers, including the
9 conventional functions of the Internet, to carry out an abstract idea—that merchants
10 could receive and track referrals from sources beyond their own. Its claims amount
11 to a drafting effort to monopolize that abstract idea by describing conventional
12 functions.

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C.

### The Essociate Patent Is Directed To Ineligible Subject Matter

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### 1. *Alice* Step 1: The claims of the Essociate Patent are directed to an abstract idea.

16 As explained above, under *Alice*, the court must first determine whether the 17 claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, including an abstract idea. 18 Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. In making this determination, the Supreme Court and 19 Federal Circuit are as interested in the purpose of the claimed invention as in the 20individual elements of the claims. In *Bilski*, the abstract idea was hedging 21 investment risk between commodity providers and market participants. In re Bilski, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3223-24 (2010). In Alice, the abstract idea was intermediating 22 23 settlements between two parties. *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2356. In *buySAFE*, the abstract 24 idea was guaranteeing contract performance. buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354-55. In 25 *Ultramercial*, the abstract idea was requiring a viewer to watch advertisements 26before delivering content. 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21633, \*11-\*12. And in Wells 27 Fargo, the abstract idea was (1) collecting data, (2) recognizing certain data within

the collected data set, and (3) storing that recognized data in a memory. 2014 U.S.
 App. LEXIS 24258 at \*7.

3 Here, the claims are directed to receiving and tracking referrals from referral sources. Receiving and tracking referrals, like hedging risk, intermediating 4 5 settlements, guaranteeing performance, showing advertisements before delivering content, and reviewing documents to recognize and record relevant data, is an 6 7 essentially old technique for ordering private obligations or relations—and is 8 likewise ineligible to be patented. It has always been common practice for merchants to receive and track referrals from people who hadn't signed up as part of 9 10 a formal referral network. Physicians getting patients from "referring physician[s]" have long been "track[ing] revenue by referral source...to show appreciation for a 11 significant increase in referrals..."<sup>8</sup> Accountants have been advised for years to 12 track their referral sources and thank them.<sup>9</sup> Lawyers have for years been receiving 13 and tracking referrals from other lawyers outside their formal referral networks, 14 including to give them referral fees when permitted.<sup>10</sup> So have real estate agents<sup>11</sup> 15 and recruiting firms.<sup>12</sup> 16

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup><sup>8</sup> Ex. 3 (Wilson, J., Jan. 1998, <u>ACP Internist</u>, "How to increase your referrals—and your revenue," <u>http://www.acpinternist.org/archives/1998/01/increfer.htm</u>). The Court can take judicial notice of background facts supported by publicly available exhibits such as this Exhibit. *See also* Clickbooth's Request For Judicial Notice, filed concurrently herewith.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ex. 4 (Nixon, R., May 30, 2000, <u>AccountingWEB</u>, "Maximizing Referral Systems In Practice," http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/maximizing-referral-systemspractice ("Once you have a new potential client presented to you, always ask where they heard about you.")).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein, P.C. v. Gourvitz*, 287 N.J.
<sup>27</sup> Super. 533, 671 A.2d 613 (1996) ("Tobin contacted defendant, then a member of the firm Gourvitz & Braun, to discuss the referral. Gourvitz represented that a 25% referral fee would be paid to plaintiff as the money was received from the client.").

Indeed, receiving and tracking referrals was common even on the Internet
 when Essociate filed its patent. Standalone systems like Amazon.com received
 referrals from affiliates they screened themselves, while merchants in "hub" affiliate
 systems outsourced the work of signing up affilites to their "hub" systems. *See supra* at 3-5. Essociate simply extended this concept by suggesting that these
 companies should configure their existing systems to also receive outside referrals.

7 As the Federal Circuit held in *Ultramercial*, claims are directed to an 8 abstract idea if "the concept embodied by the majority of the limitations" 9 describe that idea. Ultramercial, 2014 U.S. Lexis 21633 at \*11. Here, the 10 concept embodied by all of the limitations of claim 1 describe the abstract idea of receiving and tracking referrals. The claims apply that idea to a 11 12 particular technological environment— by "configuring an existing affiliate network" to assign a webmaster identifier, receiving a user request for a 13 merchant affiliate system URL, correlating the identifier, and generating a 14 15 URL for the merchant's affiliate system. But applying the abstract idea to this preexisting technological field of affiliate systems does not change the 16 17 analysis. As the Supreme Court held in *Mayo*, "the prohibition against 18 patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use 19

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- <sup>11</sup> See, e.g., Ex. 5 (San Francisco Police Officers' Association, Oct. 1991 ("We pay referral fees upon close of escrow for recommending our services.")
   (http://www.sfpoa.org/journal archives/Vol 23 No 10 October 1991.pdf)); Ex. 6
- ("Affinity and Referral/Relocation Relationships") ("The practice of charging real
- estate referral fees began nearly 30 years ago among brokers who wished to send
   and receive prospective homebuyers and sellers.")
- 25 (http://www.realtor.org/infoindx.nsf/f82521860908aedb852563fb007633d1/75de00 90ea77cb08862567670061e54a/\$FILE/Affinrpt.htm).

<sup>26</sup> <sup>12</sup> *Mary Dolan & Assocs., Inc. v. San Benito Med. Assocs.*, C0-97-1075, 1998 Minn.

App. LEXIS 103, \*7 (1998) ("San Benito was obliged to keep track of which recruiting firm had first referred the candidate and which firm was properly entitled to a referral fee.").

of the formula to a particular technological environment." *Mayo*, 133 S. Ct.
 at 1297 (citing *Bilski*, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3255).

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3 Dependent claim 10 further applies this method to referrals using one type of advertisement on the Internet—a banner ad. Ex. 1 at col. 22:44-46. But Essociate 4 did not invent the banner ad or the tracking of referrals therefrom. The Background 5 section of the Essociate Patent discloses that most merchants already used some 6 7 form of affiliate system to track traffic and compensate webmasters for referrals that 8 are often sent by webmasters using links "in the form of a Merchant's advertisement, 9 such as a banner ad." Ex. 1 at col. 2:8-18. So tracking referrals from banner ads is 10 just another limitation on the technological environment in which the abstract idea is 11 implemented. And narrowing the technological environment does not transform an 12 abstract idea into a patentable invention. Mayo, 133 S. Ct. at 1297. Therefore, 13 claim 10 is also directed to an abstract idea under step 1 of *Alice*.

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## 2. *Alice* Step 2: The claims of the Essociate Patent append only conventional computer technology to the abstract idea.

The second step of the *Alice* test is a "search for an 'inventive concept'." 16 17 Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. To satisfy this test, "[a] claim that recites an abstract idea 18 must include additional features to ensure that the claim is more than a drafting 19 effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2356. See also 20 Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294 (finding method not patentable, even when a series of 21 "conventional," "routine," or "well-understood" limitations were appended to an 22 otherwise unpatentable principle). As noted above, adding "a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis ...." Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2357; see also 23 Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 24

Instead, the question here, as in *Alice*, is whether the claims do more than
simply use "conventional" and "basic functions" of a generic computer to
implement the abstract idea. *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2359. As explained below, they do
not.

Claim 1, and its dependent claim 10, are the focus of the analysis below,
 but the analysis for counterpart claims 15, 23, 28 and 36 is legally indistinguishable.

# a. Claim 1 preamble: providing Virtual Affiliates to an affiliate system

5 The preamble of claim 1 recites "A method for providing Virtual Affiliates to an existing target affiliate system ..." As explained above, "the prohibition against 6 7 patenting abstract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the 8 formula to a particular technological environment." Mayo, 133 S. Ct. at 1297 (citing Bilski, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3255). Here, Essociate has applied the abstract idea 9 10 of receiving and tracking referrals from referral sources (the virtual affiliates) to the technological environment of an "existing target affiliate system." That does not 11 change the nature of this claim. See also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610, 611. 12

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### b. Claim 1, step 1: configuring a system to receive referrals

In *Alice*, the claims were invalid because they "simply instruct[ed] the
practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic
computer." *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2359. The function performed by the computer at
each step of the process was "purely conventional" and "amount[ed] to electronic
record-keeping—one of the most basic functions of a computer." *Id*.

The claims here are similarly invalid because they instruct a practitioner to
implement the abstract idea of receiving and tracking referrals on a generic
computer, using it for a conventional electronic record-keeping function. In
particular, step 1 of claim 1 is

23 "configuring an existing target affiliate system to receive referrals
24 from a first plurality of Webmasters in an affiliate pool of source
Webmasters such that the target Merchant affiliate system recognizes
a transaction as originating from a source Webmaster in an affiliate
26 pooling system."

27 Ex. 1, col. 21:47-53.

The specification explains that "configuring" a system includes laying out 1 2 "guidelines for integration of the Virtual affiliate system and the existing Merchant 3 affiliate system ... such that subsequent operations ... between the systems can be 4 executed." Ex. 1, col. 8:34-41. These guidelines need to be laid out by a person 5 who will be "choosing the mode of transfer" of data from among "e-mail" or 6 "manual entry of the information" (*id.*, col. 9:1-6) as well as the "terms of 7 compensation for referring Webmasters." Id., col. 9:21-30. See also id., col. 16:54-8 55 ("The parties also agree on a set commission structure for transactions.").

9 Here, instructing practitioners to "configure" an existing computerized system
10 "to receive referrals" does not transform the nature of the claims any more than
11 instructing practitioners in *Alice* to implement the abstract idea of intermediated
12 settlements on a computer, including by creating certain "shadow" accounts. *Alice*,
13 134 S.Ct. at 2359. In both cases, the patentee is merely using the computer to create
14 accounts for "electronic recordkeeping," which does not transform the nature of the
15 claim. *Id*.

Moreover, applying a patent-ineligible idea to a "preexisting audience" does not transform the nature of a claim. *Mayo*, 133 S. Ct. at 1297. Here, under *Mayo*, telling programmers to "configure" an "existing" affiliate system to receive referrals from a new source is nothing more than a suggestion that they should "apply" the patent-ineligible idea to a "particular technological environment." *Id*. For that reason as well, it is not "significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (*quoting Mayo*, 132 S.Ct. 1289).

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### c. Claim 1, step 1a: assigning identifiers to Webmasters

Claim 1 breaks down the conventional record-keeping function into several
steps. Step 1a requires "assigning a source Webmaster unique identifier for each of
said first plurality of Webmasters each operating at least one web site."

Assigning an ID to a webmaster is part of conventional "electronic recordkeeping" on the Internet. The Essociate Patent itself admits that conventional

affiliate systems already had a "back-end tracking mechanism" that kept "track of
 transactions and credit[ed] affiliates," meaning webmasters. *Id.*, col. 2:35-36.<sup>13</sup>
 Indeed, it would be difficult to keep track of webmasters on the Internet without
 assigning them unique IDs. Unique IDs are the most basic identifier available to
 keep track of individuals accessing a network.

6 Thus, assigning unique IDs for electronic record-keeping does not transform
7 the nature of this claim under *Alice*.

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### d. Claim 1, step 2: receiving a request for a merchant system

9 Step 2 of claim 1 uses the Internet for what it has always been used for, 10 communication between two or more parties. It recites "receiving a user request for a target Merchant affiliate system URL from a web site operated by a particular 11 referring Webmaster of the first plurality of Webmasters wherein the user request 12 13 includes the source Webmaster unique identifier for the particular referring Webmaster, and wherein the target Merchant affiliate system includes a unique 14 identification system for its own affiliated Webmasters." Ex. 1, col. 21:58-65. 15 Boiling this down, this step receives a request for a merchant affiliate system URL 16 17 that identifies the website that referred the user.

As Essociate's patent admits, prior Internet affiliate systems were receiving
user requests for merchant URLs (Uniform Resource Locators) displaying
advertisements on a web page. *Id.*, col. 1:47-52 ("A Merchant therefore must make
known, or advertise, its URL in order to reach those users on the Internet that are
interested in the goods and/or services offered. Hypertext links ... provide the user
with a path or entry point to the Merchant's URL."). In addition, as explained in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> In fact, the Court can take judicial notice of the Amazon.com prior art patent made of record on the face of the Essociate Patent that describes how "referral links" of the associate are "transmitted to the Merchant website in response to the selection of the link" and that "this information includes a unique identifier of the associate (assigned upon enrollment)...." Ex. 2 (U.S. Patent No. 6,029,141), col. 7:21-30.

connection with the last step, assigning unique identifiers for particular webmasters
 to be included in the URL was also conventional in running affiliate systems.

Similarly, Essociate did not invent "identification systems" for merchant
affiliates for electronic book-keeping purposes. Conventional merchant affiliate
systems already had identification systems for their own affiliated webmasters. *Id.*,
col. 2:34-36 ("Generally, the Merchant's affiliate system 100 includes the
Merchant's back-end tracking mechanism, which keeps track of transactions and
credits affiliates ....").

9 This step, therefore, also does not change the nature of this claim under *Alice*10 step 2. Essociate uses the Internet to communicate a request for a merchant, and
11 uses webmaster and merchant identifiers for "electronic record-keeping" purposes.
12 This is no different in principle to the creation of "shadow" accounts for the
13 transactions tracked in *Alice*. *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2359. In both cases, the systems
14 are keeping track of a transaction by using computers for their basic functions.

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e. Claim 1, step 3: correlating the received webmaster identifier
 The use of computers for their conventional record-keeping function
 continues in step 3 of claim 1, which recites "correlating the received source
 Webmaster unique identifier to a target Webmaster unique identifier corresponding
 to the unique identification system of the requested Merchant affiliate system."

20To allow a handoff of referrals to the tracking system of the target webmaster 21 system, Essociate cross-referenced or "correlated" the unique IDs from its own 22 referral sources with those of the target affiliate system. See Ex. 1, col. 11, lines 8-23 12. Using a computer to cross-reference two related sets of IDs "amounts to 24 electronic recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a computer." Alice, 25 134 S.Ct. at 2359. The Internet was in fact premised on correlating identifiers, for example, a webmaster domain name entered into a web browser is correlated with a 26numerical IP address for that webmaster. The concept of correlating ID numbers is 27 28not only conventional on the Internet, but has always been part of record-keeping

involving two or more identification systems. For example, legal code books
 correlate old and new statute numbers to help lawyers keep track of changes in the
 law. And healthcare systems have long strived to "correlate and cross-reference
 patient identifiers such as name, birthday and Social Security number."<sup>14</sup>

All the Essociate Patent did was to use a "lookup table that cross references
the two codes." Ex. 1, col. 11:9-12. This is a mundane recordkeeping task, far more
conventional than the task in *Alice* of carrying out multi-million-dollar banking
transactions by creating "shadow' credits and debit records (*i.e.*, account ledgers)
that mirror the balances in the parties' real-world accounts," updating them in real
time as transactions are entered, and issuing simultaneous instructions to relevant
financial institutions. *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2352, 2359.

Thus, using a computer for this basic electronic bookkeeping function of
correlating between two identification systems is conventional and, under *Alice*, it
does not permit Essociate to monopolize the idea of receiving and tracking referrals
for existing affiliate systems.

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### f. Claim 1, step 4: generating a URL for the merchant

The final step of claim 1 again uses the Internet for its conventional electroniccommunication and record-keeping function. Step 4 recites:

- "generating a URL for the requested Merchant affiliate system,
   wherein the URL includes the correlated target Webmaster Merchant
   unique identifier, whereby the URL can be utilized to access the
   requested Merchant affiliate system, and further provide identification
- 22 of the source Webmaster for requisite tracking."
- 23 Generating URLs for merchant affiliate systems so they could track
- 24 webmasters was the way existing affiliate systems worked when Essociate applied
- <sup>14</sup> Ex. 7 (<u>http://www.cchfreedom.org/cchf.php/274</u>) ( "Until now, there has been no common indexing to correlate and cross-reference patient identifiers such as name, birthday and Social Security number while accurately and automatically matching patient records. This MPI will provide the link for these records.").

for a patent. Ex. 1, col. 1:38-42 ("The movement from one URL to another ... is 1 2 particularly well-suited to the exchange of information, goods, and services between 3 buyers ('users') and sellers ('Merchants')."). The Essociate Patent admits that conventional affiliate systems had a "back-end tracking mechanism" that kept "track 4 5 of transactions and credit[ed] affiliates." (Id., col. 2:35-36.) That the URL can be used to identify the webmaster was also conventional, including in the Amazon.com 6 7 prior art system cited on the face of the Essociate Patent. See Ex. 1, Fig. 4, col. 8 11:1-16 ("The unique store ID 406 represents the information created and stored in 9 the associate's database during the associate enrollment process...").

In short, generating a URL to carry out its conventional record-keeping
function on the Internet also does not transform the nature of the claim, whether
viewed by itself or as an ordered combination with the other conventional uses of
the Internet recited in the claim, *i.e.*, configuring the system to receive referrals,
assigning webmaster IDs, receiving a request for a merchant, and correlating the ID
to the one used by the merchant.

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### g. Claim 10: banner ads

As explained earlier, claim 10 recites "A method as recited in claim 1,
wherein at least one of the plurality of Webmasters operates a web site having a
banner ad for a related Merchant affiliate system." This is conventional Internet
activity, as the Essociate Patent admits. Webmasters operating web sites having
links to other websites was a conventional part of the Internet. Ex. 1 col. 2:10-13.
"These links are often in the form of a Merchant's advertisement, such as a banner
ad." *Id.*, col. 2:13-14.

As the Court held in *Alice*, "a claim that recites an abstract idea must include
 additional features to ensure that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
 monopolize the abstract idea." *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2347. Here, the necessary
 additional features are missing because, like the patentee in *Alice*, Essociate used

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conventional functions to carry out the abstract idea. That is true whether the 1 2 functions are considered "separately" or "as an ordered combination" of steps. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359. When viewed as a whole, the method simply instructs that 3 4 the idea should be applied using the Internet and computers for their basic electronic 5 record-keeping functions, that is, by: "configuring" an existing affiliate system to receive referrals, "assigning" webmaster identifiers, "receiving" a user request that 6 7 included the identifier, correlating it with the identifier used by the merchant 8 affiliate system, and generating a URL for the merchant system that included the 9 identifier for tracking purposes. This does not add "significantly more" to the 10 abstract idea, which is simply limited to the technological field of existing affiliate systems. Alice, 134 S.Ct. 2355. 11

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3.

The claims also fail under the "machine-or-transformation" test for patent eligibility

In addition to failing the "inventive concept" test in Alice, the patent claims 14 15 fail to satisfy the "machine-or-transformation" test for being patent eligible. The Federal Circuit has held that the "machine-or-transformation test," while not the sole 16 17 test for determining patent eligibility, can provide a useful clue in the second step of 18 the Alice framework. Ultramercial, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21633, at \*15. A claimed process can be patent eligible under Section 101 if: (1) it is tied to a 19 20particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a 21 different state or thing. In re Bilksi, 545 F.3d at 954 (en banc), aff'd on other 22 grounds, Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.

Here, neither prong of the machine-or-transformation test is met. First, the
claims here "are not tied to any particular novel machine or apparatus, only a
general purpose computer." *Ultramercial*, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21633, at \*15.
Second, the claims do not satisfy the transformation prong of the test. In *Ultramercial*, the method involved "a transaction involving the grant of permission
and viewing of an advertisement by the consumer, the grant of access by the content

provider, and the exchange of money between the sponsor and the content 1 2 provider." Id. \*16. As the court noted, "manipulations of public or private legal 3 obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet 4 the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are not 5 representative of any physical objects or substances. Id. (citing Bilski, 545 F.3d at 6 963). The fact that the transaction claimed in *Ultramercial* did not transform any 7 article or thing into a different thing was "a further reason" why the claim did not 8 contain anything more than conventional steps relating to using advertising as a currency. 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21633, at \*16. Here, the claimed method of the 9 10 Essociate Patent does not transform anything into another thing. It merely keeps track of who should be credited for a referral, which is a manipulation of "private 11 legal obligations" and not representative of any physical object. As in Ultramercial, 12 13 the claims merely describe "an abstraction—an idea, having no particular concrete or tangible form." Ultramercial, 2014 WL 5904902, at \*4. Claims 1, 10, 15, 23, 28 14 15 and 36, are therefore invalid for lack of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 16 § 101.

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4. Claims 15, 23, 28 and 36 are likewise ineligible because they merely recast Essociate's method claims as computer-media or system claims

20 In *Alice*, the Supreme Court held that Alice's "claims to a computer system" 21 and a computer-readable medium fail for substantially the same reasons" as the 22 method claims. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360. Any claims that merely "recite a handful 23 of generic computer components configured to implement the same [ineligible] 24 idea" are likewise ineligible. Id. That is the case here. The "program embodied on a computer readable media" recited in claims 15 and 23 is identical in substance to 25 26the method steps recited in claims 1 and 10. The recasting of a "method" as a program on a "computer readable media" adds nothing to the eligibility analysis. 27

*CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.*, 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
 *buySAFE*, 765 F.3d at 1354.

3 Specifically, the preamble of claim 15 recites "[a] computer program 4 embodied on a computer readable medium for providing Virtual Affiliates to an 5 existing affiliate system, the computer program code comprising...." Ex. 1, col. 22:65-68. It then goes onto recite essentially the same steps as claim 1, where each 6 7 step is preceded by the words "a code segment for." That is, the claims recite "a 8 code segment for configuring an existing affiliate system," "a code segment for assigning a unique identifier," "a code segment for receiving a user request," "a 9 10 code segment for correlating the received source Webmaster identifier," and "a code 11 segment for generating a URL for the requested Merchant affiliate system." Ex. 1, 12 col. 23:1-26. Instructions to a computer are always performed by software, *i.e.*, a 13 sequence of "code segments," so, as the courts have recognized, appending these 14 words to a method claim does not change the analysis for patent eligibility. 15 CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375; buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1354. Claim 23 is identical to claim 10. It merely further limits the field of use of the abstract idea to 16 17 webmasters that use banner ads.

The "system" claims likewise add nothing. Claim 28 and 36 merely add
"means for" performing the steps found in claims 1 and 10. *See* Ex. 1 (Essociate
Patent), certificate of correction, Oct. 12, 2004. But those "means"—limited to the
means described in the patent under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6—are nothing beyond
"generic computer components configured to implement the same idea." *Alice*, 134
S.Ct. at 2360. As such, they can add nothing to the eligibility analysis, lest patent
eligibility "depend simply on the draftsman's art." *Id.*

Specifically, claim 28 recites "means for configuring an existing system,"
"means for receiving a user request," "means for correlating the received unique
identifier," and "means for "generating a URL." Essociate does not disclose
anything in the specification beyond generic computer components to carry out

these functions. It therefore has failed to add "significantly more" to the claims than
 the abstract idea of receiving and tracking referrals for existing affiliate systems.
 *Alice*, 134 S.Ct. at 2360.

4 5 5.

# Nothing Essociate has proffered supports the patent eligibility of its claims.

6 Essociate has argued in this litigation against Clickbooth that its patent claims are "far from abstract" because the patent "involves displaying materials to a user, 7 8 user interaction with a user interface, communications between numerous computer servers, and information delivered to a remote user's computer in a format that 9 10 permits display compatible with the user's hardware." (Dkt. No. 20 at 5:26-6:2.) In 11 other words, the patent involves a computer, a web browser, and the Internet. There 12 is no patentable subject matter, just an abstract idea applied to standard computers. 13 As the Supreme Court has now squarely held, "merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform [an] abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." 14 15 Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2352. Essociate's arguments therefore further support granting judgment on the pleadings. 16

### 17 **IV. CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the asserted claims of the Essociate Patent are
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Accordingly,
the Court should find all asserted claims of the patent invalid and grant judgment on
the pleadings in Clickbooth's favor.

22	Dated: January 5. 2015		
23			Hinch Newman LLP
24			
25		Bv	/s/ Richard B. Newman Richard B. Newman
26			
27			Attorneys for Defendant and Counter-Claimant CLICKBOOTH.COM. LLC
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			-24-
			AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT CLICKBOOTH.COM, LLC' ON THE PLEADINGS BASED UPON UNPATENTABILITY UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 10